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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A NEW TEST FOR POLITICAL
FIRINGS-Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether a government employee may be dis-
missed solely because of his political party affiliation is of continu-
ing importance to some twelve and a half million employees at all
levels of government.' The right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.2 Therefore,
dismissal of a government employee solely because he is a Demo-
crat or Republican infringes on his first amendment right to free
political association.3 Although lower-echelon employees are pro-
tected by civil service restrictions on patronage removals, most
higher level employees are not.'
Before 1976, it was held that the government's interest in en-
suring a loyal, efficient and responsible administration justified pa-
tronage dismissals. Then, the Supreme Court of the United States
in Elrod v. Burns' held patronage removals to be an unconstitu-
tional violation of the first and fourteenth amendments except
when the dismissed official could be properly classified as a "poli-
cymaking" or "confidential" employee.
The Supreme Court recently changed the Elrod standard in
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
218 (1971).
2. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) which said that "[t]here can no longer be any doubt that
freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs
and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.").
3. 427 U.S. at 360.
4. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting
opinion).
5. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp,
443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375, 378 (1971).
6. 427 U.S. 347.
7. Id. at 368, 375.
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Branti v. Finkel.8 Mr. Justice Stevens, 9 dissatisfied with the Elrod
standard, reasoned that the party in power does not have an over-
riding government interest in seeing every policymaking, confiden-
tial position filled only with someone who belongs to the political
party of the new administration.10 The Branti Court changed
Elrod by requiring new administrations to demonstrate that party
affiliation is an "appropriate requirement for the effective perform-
ance of the public office involved."1 If the administration can meet
this burden, the employee in question may be removed solely be-
cause of his political affiliation.
THE CASE
Plaintiffs in Branti were Republicans serving as assistant pub-
lic defenders in Rockland County, New York. 2 After an election, a
new Democrat-dominated administration came to power and,
shortly thereafter, executed plaintiffs' termination notices. Plain-
tiffs brought suit in Federal district court to enjoin the administra-
tion from terminating plaintiffs' employment. The trial court
found that plaintiffs had been performing their duties satisfacto-
rily and that they were threatened with dismissal solely because
they were Republicans. 8 Applying the Elrod standard, the court
found that an assistant public defender does not participate in pol-
icy formulations, nor is his position one requiring a confidential
relationship with a policymaker.1 4 Based on these findings, the
trial court granted the injunction holding that the new administra-
tion could not terminate plaintiffs' employment as assistant public
defenders." Specifically, any attempted political firing would vio-
late plaintiffs' first and fourteenth" amendment rights to associate
8. 445 U.S. 507.
9. Mr. Justice Stevens was a member of the Supreme Court when Elrod was
decided but did not participate in the consideration of that case. 427 U.S. at 374.
10. 445 U.S. at 518.
11. Id.
12. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district
court noted that an assistant public defender is not protected by civil service
constraints.
13. Id. at 1292.
14. Id. at 1291.
15. Id. at 1293.
16. Id. Presumably, the trial court meant that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment incorporates the first amendment right of association thus
making the latter applicable to the states.
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with the political party of their choice. 1 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.18 The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari to consider the standard required by the
first amendment in political firing cases.' 9
BACKGROUND
Prior to the 1970's, courts were reluctant to overturn pa-
tronage dismissals.20 Most attacks on patronage dismissals were
based on due process rather than first amendment arguments."1
Continued government employment was considered a mere privi-
lege, not a right or entitlement within the meaning of due pro-
cess.22 Those not qualified for protection under the civil service
system were considered employees-at-will and could be dismissed
summarily without a pretermination hearing.'3
In Alomar v. Dywer,'" plaintiff was dismissed from her posi-
tion as a "Neighborhood Services Representative" for the City of
Rochester because she was a Democrat.25 Relief was denied for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.26 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressly held that such govern-
ment action does not deny one the right to associate with the polit-
ical party of one's choice.27 During the same period, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief to some
5,000 employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion who were threatened with termination by a newly-elected ad-
17. Id.
18. Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (an unpublished memoran-
dum opinion with cite appearing in tables).
19. 445 U.S. at 511.
20. Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020
(1972); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v.
Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961).
22. Id. at 897.
23. Id. at 896-97 (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959) which
said if an employee does not qualify for civil service protection, then he is at the
complete mercy of the firing authority and can be dismissed "at any time without
the giving of a reason ....
24. 447 F.2d 482.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 483.
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ministration." The court rationalized that a state employee com-
ing into his position as the result of the spoils system should not
later be heard to complain of dismissal for the same reason.2 9 The
refusal to recognize first amendment rights in the area of pa-
tronage dismissals was based on the view that the first amendment
does not guarantee continued government employment.80
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court followed earlier suggestions from the United States Supreme
Court that political affiliation by itself may not be appropriate
grounds for dismissal of some government employees. Dictum in
one case indicated that a cafeteria worker in a United States gun
factory could not have been dismissed from her employment sim-
ply because she was a Democrat or a Methodist." Dictum in an-
other case recognized that "Congress may not 'enact a regulation
providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to
federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or
take any active part in missionary work.' "82
During the 1960's and 1970's, the Supreme Court considered
numerous cases which dealt with public employees' rights under
the first amendment. For example, in Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents," a New York statute barred members of the Communist
Party from public employment. The Supreme Court held the stat-
ute unconstitutional because it' violated the Communist Party
members' first amendment right of political association." In Perry
v. Sindermann,5 the Supreme Court recognized that a government
28. 443 Pa. at -, 280 A.2d at 378.
29. Id. See also Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151,
166 A.2d 278, 280 (1960) saying that "[w]ithout more, an appointed public em-
ployee takes his job subject to the possibility of summary removal by the employ-
ing authority." The Scott case could be read as standing for the proposition that
in all public employment contracts not subject to civil service constraints, there is
an implied condition that the employee may be summarily dismissed by the firing
authority.
30. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd mem., 341
U.S. 918 (1951). Plaintiff in Bailey had been disqualified from employment by the
United States Government because of her possible involvement with a communist
political association.
31. 367 U.S. at 898 (plaintiff's discharge upheld for other reasons).
32. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (principle re-
affirmed in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) (citing Mitchell)).
33. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
34. Id. at 595.
35. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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employee may not be denied a government benefit for engaging in
constitutionally protected speech.3" In Perry, a professor had spo-
ken out against certain policies enacted by the hiring authority at
the college where he worked. The hiring authority reacted by re-
fusing to renew his contract at the end of the teaching year. The
Court said that the college could not refuse to renew the profes-
sor's contract solely because he had criticized administrative
policies.3 1
Although these precedents did not address the issue of politi-
cal firings directly, Keyishian recognized that a public employee
has a constitutional right of free political association and Perry
recognized that a government employee has a constitutionally pro-
tected right of free speech. Recognition of these rights provided
the basis for the Supreme Court's attack in Elrod v. Burns" on the
political patronage system-a practice which had flourished since
the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Eras. 9 In Elrod, the plaintiffs
were government employees working in a county sheriffs office and
had duties ranging from bailiff and process server to security guard
and deputy.40 Traditionally the newly-elected sheriff would remove
all non-civil service employees and replace them with members of
his own party.41 Following this tradition, the newly-elected sheriff
dismissed the plaintiffs when they failed to change their party sta-
tus from Republican to Democrat." The Supreme Court held that
36. Id. at 597.
37. Id. at 598.
38. 427 U.S. at 360. The Court in Branti emphasized this when it said "[i]f
the First Amendment protects a public employee from discharge based on what
he has said, it must also protect him from discharge based on what he believes."
445 U.S. at 515.
39. 427 U.S. at 369; see Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d
561, 568 (7th Cir. 1972); Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PuB.
ADMIN. REV. 28 (1960).
40. 427 U.S. at 350-51.
41. Id. at 351.
42. Id. The Elrod Court did not directly confront the question of whether an
employee who had not been actually coerced into changing party registration and
who had simply been discharged without a chance to change parties could be dis-
missed under the patronage system. In Elrod, the sheriff threatened to dismiss
plaintiffs unless they joined the Democratic party. The public defender in Branti
never exerted any overt political coercion to change parties. Both plaintiffs were
dismissed despite the fact that one employee (Finkel) actually did change parties
in an attempt to prevent his dismissal. The Branti Court rejected the public de-
fender's argument that Elrod demanded a showing of overt coercion. 445 U.S. at
516 n.l1.
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the hiring authority had unconstitutionally conditioned continued
employment on the employees changing their political affiliation."'
Only when the government can demonstrate "an overriding inter-
est," as when higher-echelon employees are involved, may it play
the spoils game." The important question became: What criteria
should the new administration use to determine whether a particu-
lar employee is subject to patronage dismissal? The Elrod plurality
drew the line at the policymaking level of employment.45 Thus, an.
employee responsible for formulating policy would not be pro-
tected against political firings. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stewart said that an employee whose position places him in a con-
fidential relationship with the hiring authority also would not be
protected against political firings.4
Elrod failed to define the precise meaning of the "policymak-
ing" and "confidential" labels thus leaving it up to the lower courts
to decide. Generally, the lower courts have interpreted "poli-
cymaker" to mean one who actively'7 or directly" participates in
formulating governmental policy. A "confidential" employee is
"one who is privy to the discussions and information involved in
the policymaking process," not necessarily one who may carry out
covert governmental assignments.49 A private secretary to a poli-
cymaker is an example of a confidential employee. 50 Another court
pointed out that the more a public position requires an employee
to participate in policymaking, the more difficult the decision be-
comes so that a full factual inquiry into the nature of the employ-
ment becomes imperative. 51 The Supreme Court's creation of a
new standard in Branti applicable to political firings was an at-
43. Id. at 359.
44 * 445 U.S. at 516 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 368).
45. 427 U.S. at 372.
46. Id. at 375.
47. See Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352, 1364 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (super-
intendents of refuse and highways, who acted as advisors to policymakers, were
properly dismissed under the Elrod criteria).
48. See Savage v. Pennsylvania, 475 F. Supp. 524, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (a
hearing examiner for a liquor control board was held to be a non-policymaking,
nonconfidential employee and was ordered reinstated).
49. Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 393 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1977) (the Elrod test
was construed as requiring consideration of both the "confidential" and "poli-
cymaking" labels rather than either confidential or policymaking considerations).
50. See Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. at 1291.
51. Retail Clerks International Assoc. v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp. 663, 667 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
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tempt to eliminate these labels and replace them with a more ab-
stract test thus restating the same basic proposition as Elrod.
ANALYSIS
The Branti majority held that employment of an assistant
public defender cannot be conditioned on party affiliation. The
firing authority's dismissal of such an employee violates the first
and fourteenth amendment rights to associate with the political
party of one's choice.5 2 The majority could have simply affirmed on
the basis of Elrod holding that an assistant public defender is not
a policymaking or confidential employee. Instead Mr. Justice Ste-
vens set forth a new test for measuring the state's interest in polit-
ical firings: "In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label
'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the
question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective per-
formance of the public office involved." 3
The Branti Court agreed with the Elrod decision in the princi-
ple that political firings significantly chill first amendment rights
and must therefore "survive exacting scrutiny."5 4 The government
then has a heavy burden of persuading the fact-finder that the
state has an "overriding interest" in dismissing the employee in
question. 55 Because the critical factor concerns the nature of the
public office in question, each case must turn on its own facts.
Branti agreed that patronage dismissals must "further some vital
government end by a means that is least restrictive,5 6 but it pur-
ported to abandon the labels "policymaker" and "confidential" as
the only criteria for determining the nature of the employment.57
Mr. Justice Stevens reasoned that the government does not have
an overriding interest in dismissing every employee who may be
considered a policymaker. For example, a university football coach
makes policy, but his coaching ability does not depend on whether
he is a Republican or Democrat." The new standard is simply
whether effective performance of the job depends on party affilia-
52. 445 U.s. at 520.
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 515.
55. Id. at 516.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 518.
58. Id.
1981]
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tion," but the Court did not define "effective performance" or say
what it meant.
Although the new test is applied easily to a football coach hy-
pothetical and yields a clear result (should not be dismissed for
political reasons), application of the test in a more difficult situa-
tion demonstrates its weakness. For example, effective perform-
ance of the duties of a United States Attorney General arguably
does not depend on whether he is a Republican or Democrat as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Powell in his dissent; however, it would
appear imprudent to prevent the President from using party affili-
ation as a means for dismissing an Attorney General.60 Applying
the Elrod criteria to the Attorney General hypothetical would be
more appropriate: Since an Attorney General stands in a confiden-
tial relationship with the President and is charged with developing
government policy, a Republican President should be able to dis-
miss an Attorney General who is a Democrat.
If the purpose for the Branti standard is to provide a clear
statement of the Supreme Court's position on patronage practices
or to clarify a previously confused area of law, it is questionable
whether the Court accomplished its purpose. In future applica-
tions, the hiring authority may not be able to determine if political
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective perform-
ance of the public office involved.61 Mr. Justice Powell criticized
the new standard by saying that its language is vague and likely to
create confusion in its application. 2 He argued that newly-elected
administrations will be at a loss as to where to draw the line with
the net result being that each new appointee will have to be cau-
tioned that his prospective employment may be.jeopardized by a
lawsuit initiated by the former employee who held that office."
The courts would in effect be called upon to implement a form of
judicial civil service."
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 524-25 (Powell, J., dissenting opinion).
62. Id. at 524.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 524-26. See generally parts III, IV and V of the dissent strongly
defended patronage practices: "In sum, the effect of the Court's decision will be to
decrease the accountability and denigrate the role of our national political par-
ties." Id. at 531. "The facts of this case also demonstrate that the Court's decision
well may impair the right of local voters to structure their government." Id. at
532.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, who had concurred in Elrod," dissented
in Branti because he was in favor of applying the policymaker-con-
fidential approach in determining whether the state had an over-
riding interest in dismissing an assistant public defender." Com-
paring the public defender's office to that of a law firm, he would
have held that a confidential relationship exists between an assis-
tant public defender and the hiring authority, who was also an
attorney.67
CONCLUSION
In holding that the dismissal of an assistant public defender
solely because of his party affiliation infringes on his first and four-
teenth amendment rights, the Branti Court enunciated a new stan-
dard whereby the state must now demonstrate that effective per-
formance of the public office in question is dependent on party
affiliation. Although Branti sought to eliminate the problems with
the old Elrod test, the new standard probably will cause as much
uncertainty and difficulty in its application as did Elrod.68
One probable effect of Branti will be to create additional liti-
gation in an already crowded court system. Branti failed to ex-
amine the alternative of deferring judgment to the statutory civil
service or merit programs set up by legislative branches at all
levels of government. Civil service legislation presently provides
job protection to certain classified, lower-echelon governmental
employees. Other higher level positions are not protected by civil
service constraints. As long as the line drawn by the legislature is
reasonable, why should the courts intervene? Deferring to legisla-
tive judgment would serve to reduce rather than increase the
court's workload.
Another probable effect of Branti will be to cause the hiring
authority to either create new positions or to transfer employees to
other jobs. As to the latter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has recently construed the Branti principle to include a wider
range of patronage burdens than threatened or actual dismissals."
The Fourth Circuit held that under the right circumstances, trans-
fer or reassignment, when based solely on political motives may
65. 427 U.S. at 374.
66. 445 U.S. at 520-21.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting opinion).
69. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
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constitute a violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights. 0
The court remanded for further development of the facts in light
of Branti, instructing the trial court that plaintiff must show the
transfer imposed so unfair a choice as to be equivalent to
dismissal.71
Branti may have purported to abandon the "policymaker" and
"confidential" labels as the sole means for determining whether
the state has an overriding interest in dismissal, but it does not
follow that these labels are never appropriate. When applying
Branti, trial courts, as well as the firing authority, probably will
continue to examine the policymaking, confidential nature of the
employment as at least one factor in the outcome. Certainly the
fact that a public official is responsible for formulating policy
based on the campaign promises of the incoming administration
strongly suggests that effective performance of that position de-
pends upon party affiliation.
Mr. Justice Stewart's enunciation of the Elrod standard that a
nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employee cannot be dismissed
solely because of his political affiliation gave the firing authority a
concrete, workable test by which political firings were to be judged.
According to Branti, the firing authority now must show that effec-
tive performance of the employee's duties depends on his party af-
filiation; thus, Branti changes the Elrod standard by stating the
same basic proposition in abstract terms. Since the firing author-
ity, rather than the courts, will make the initial determination of
whether it has the right to fire an employee solely for political rea-
sons, the standard which should have been adopted is the one
more certain to reach a legal result at the time dismissal is being
considered. Mr. Justice Stewart's Elrod standard met these practi-
cal qualifications by giving the firing authority a more concrete ap-
proach when faced with the political firing question.
James L. Seay, Jr.
70. Id. at 620 (plaintiff in Delong, a former state director of the Farmers
Home Administration in Maine, was transferred to a job with somewhat lesser
responsibilities but continued at the same salary).
71. Id. at 624.
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